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Until recently, biological terrorism had been
little discussed or written about. Until recently, I
had doubts about publicizing the subject because
of concern that it might entice some to undertake
dangerous, perhaps catastrophic experiments.
However, events of the past 12 to 18 months have
made it clear that likely perpetrators already
envisage every possible scenario.
Four points of view prevalent among national
policy circles and the academic community at
various times have served to dismiss biological
terrorism as nothing more than a theoretical
possibility. l) Biological weapons have so seldom
been deployed that precedent would suggest they
will not be used. 2) Their use is so morally
repugnant that no one would deign to use them.
3) The science of producing enough organisms
and dispersing them is so difficult that it is within
the reach of only the most sophisticated
laboratories. 4) Like the concept of a “nuclear
winter,” the potential destructiveness of bioweapons
is essentially unthinkable and so to be dismissed.
Each of these arguments is without validity.
Nations and dissident groups exist that have
both the motivation and access to skills to
selectively cultivate some of the most dangerous
pathogens and to deploy them as agents in acts of
terrorism or war. After the Gulf War, Iraq was
discovered to have a large biological weapons
program. In 1995, Iraq confirmed that it had
produced, filled, and deployed bombs, rockets,
and aircraft spray tanks containing Bacillus
anthracis and botulinum toxin (1,2); its work
force and technologic infrastructure are still
wholly intact. Also in 1995, the Japanese cult,
Aum Shinrikyo, released the nerve gas Sarin in
the Tokyo subway. The cult also had plans for
biological terrorism (3); included in its arsenal
were large quantities of nutrient media,
botulinum toxin, anthrax cultures, and drone
aircraft equipped with spray tanks. Members of
this group had traveled to Zaire in 1992 to obtain
samples of Ebola virus for weapons development.
Of more recent concern is the status of one of
Russia’s largest and most sophisticated former
bioweapons facilities, called Vector, in Koltsovo,
Novosibirsk. Through the early 1990s, this was a
4,000-person, 30-building facility with ample
biosafety level 4 laboratory facilities, used for the
isolation of both specimens and human cases.
Situated on an open plain surrounded by electric
fences and protected by an elite guard, the facility
housed the smallpox virus as well as work on
Ebola, Marburg, and the hemorrhagic fever
viruses (e.g., Machupo and Crimean-Congo). A
visit in the autumn of 1997 found a half-empty
facility protected by a handful of guards who had
not been paid for months (P. Jahrling, pers.
comm., 1998). No one can say where the scientists
have gone, nor is there confidence now that this is
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the only storage site for smallpox virus outside the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The number of countries engaged in
biological weapons experimentation has grown
from 4 in the 1960s to 11 in the 1990s (4).
Meanwhile, the bombing of the World Trade
Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building
have dramatized the serious problems even small
dissident groups can cause.
A comprehensive review of the problems
posed by biological terrorism and warfare has
been published (5). Four observations deserve
special note. First, biological terrorism is more
likely than ever before and far more threatening
than either explosives or chemicals. Second,
official actions directed at the threat to the
civilian population (less than 2 years in the
making) have been only marginally funded and
minimally supported (6). Third, preventing or
countering bioterrorism will be extremely
difficult. Recipes for making biological weapons
are now available on the Internet, and even
groups with modest finances and basic training in
biology and engineering could develop, should
they wish, an effective weapon (7) at little cost.
Fourth, detection or interdiction of those
intending to use biological weapons is next to
impossible. Thus, the first evidence of such
weapons will almost certainly be cases in hospital
emergency rooms. Specialists in infectious
diseases thus constitute the front line of defense.
The rapidity with which they and emergency
room personnel reach a proper diagnosis and the
speed with which they apply preventive and
therapeutic measures could spell the difference
between thousands and perhaps tens of
thousands of casualties. Indeed, the survival of
physicians and health-care staff caring for the
patients may be at stake. However, today few
have ever seen so much as a single case of
smallpox, plague, or anthrax, or, for that matter,
would recall the characteristics of such cases.
Few, if any, diagnostic laboratories are prepared
to confirm promptly such diagnoses.
Of a long list of potential pathogens, only a
handful are reasonably easy to prepare and
disperse and can inflict sufficiently severe
disease to paralyze a city and perhaps a nation. In
April 1994, Anatoliy Vorobyov, a Russian
bioweapons expert, presented to a working group
of the National Academy of Sciences the
conclusions of Russian experts as to the agents
most likely to be used (8). Smallpox headed the
list followed closely by anthrax and plague. None
of these agents has so far effectively been
deployed as a biological weapon, and thus no real
world events exist to provide likely scenarios.
However, we have had several well-documented
smallpox importations into Europe over recent
decades; two bear recounting.
Smallpox is caused by a virus spread from
person to person; infected persons have a
characteristic fever and rash. Virus infection
invariably results in symptomatic disease. There
are no mild, subclinical infections among
unvaccinated persons. After an incubation period
of 10 to 12 days, the patient has high fever and
pain. Then a rash begins with small papules
developing into pustules on day 7 to 8 and finally
changing to scabs around day 12. Between 25%
and 30% of all unvaccinated patients die of the
disease. There was, and is, no specific treatment.
Until 1980, essentially all countries con-
ducted vaccination programs of some sort,
whether or not they had endemic disease (9).
Until 1972, the United States mandated
smallpox vaccination for all children at school
entry, although the last cases had occurred in
1949, 23 years before. In the United Kingdom,
four standby hospitals were to be opened only if
smallpox cases were imported, and in Germany,
two state-of-the-art isolation hospitals were
constructed in the 1960s specifically for the
isolation of smallpox cases should they occur.
In 1962, the initial response of U.S. officials
to the occurrence of a single case of smallpox
illustrated extreme concern. That year, a young
Canadian boy returned from Brazil, traveling by
air to New York and by train to Toronto by way of
Albany and Buffalo (10). Shortly after arrival in
Toronto, he developed a rash and was hospitalized.
In response to this single case, senior U.S.
government officials seriously considered a plan of
action that called for the border with Canada to be
closed, for mass vaccination campaigns to be
conducted in all cities along the route from New
York through Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, and
Buffalo, and for vaccination of all who had been in
Grand Central Station on the day the Canadian
boy was there. Sensibly, this plan was soon
scrapped for more modest measures, albeit not
without considerable debate.
The potential of aerosolized smallpox to
spread over a considerable distance and to
infect at low doses was vividly demonstrated in
an outbreak in Germany in 1970 (11). That year,490 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998
Special Issue
a German electrician returning from Pakistan
became ill with high fever and diarrhea. On
January 11, he was admitted to a local hospital
and was isolated in a separate room on the
ground floor because it was feared he might have
typhoid fever. He had contact with only two
nurses over the next 3 days. On January 14 a
rash developed, and on January 16 the diagnosis
of smallpox was confirmed. He was immediately
transported to one of Germany’s special
isolation hospitals, and more than 100,000
persons were promptly vaccinated. The hospital
had been closed to visitors because of an
influenza outbreak for several days before the
patient was admitted. After the diagnosis of
smallpox, other hospital patients and staff were
quarantined for 4 weeks and were vaccinated;
very ill patients received vaccinia-immune
globulin first. However, the smallpox patient
had had a cough, a symptom seldom seen with
smallpox; coughing can produce a large-volume,
small-particle aerosol like what might occur
after its use as a terrorist weapon. Subse-
quently, 19 cases occurred in the hospital,
including four in other rooms on the patient’s
floor, eight on the floor above, and nine on the
third floor. Two were contact cases. One of the
cases was in a visitor who had spent fewer than
15 minutes in the hospital and had only briefly
opened a corridor door, easily 30 feet from the
patient’s room, to ask directions. Three of the
patients were nurses, one of whom died. This
outbreak occurred in a well-vaccinated popula-
tion.
An outbreak in Yugoslavia in February 1972
also illustrates the havoc created even by a small
number of cases. Yugoslavia’s last case of smallpox
had occurred in 1927. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia,
like most countries, had continued populationwide
vaccination to protect against imported cases. In
1972, a pilgrim returning from Mecca became ill
with an undiagnosed febrile disease. Friends and
relatives visited from a number of different areas; 2
weeks later, 11 of them became ill with high fever
and rash. The patients were not aware of each
other’s illness, and their physicians (few of
whom had ever seen a case of smallpox) failed
to make a correct diagnosis.
One of the 11 patients was a 30-year-old
teacher who quickly became critically ill with the
hemorrhagic form, a form not readily diagnosed
even by experts. The teacher was first given
penicillin at a local clinic, but as he became
increasingly ill, he was transferred to a
dermatology ward in a city hospital, then to a
similar ward in the capital city, and finally to a
critical care unit because he was bleeding
profusely and in shock. He died before a definitive
diagnosis was made. He was buried 2 days before
the first case of smallpox was recognized.
The first cases were correctly diagnosed 4
weeks after the first patient became ill, but by
then, 150 persons were already infected; of these,
38 (including two physicians, two nurses, and
four other hospital staff) were infected by the
young teacher. The cases occurred in widely
separated areas of the country. By the time of
diagnosis, the 150 secondary cases had already
begun to expose yet another generation, and,
inevitably, questions arose as to how many other
yet undetected cases there might be.
Health authorities launched a nationwide
vaccination campaign. Mass vaccination clinics
were held, and checkpoints along roads were
established to examine vaccination certificates.
Twenty million persons were vaccinated. Hotels
and residential apartments were taken over,
cordoned off by the military, and all known contacts
of cases were forced into these centers under
military guard. Some 10,000 persons spent 2 weeks
or more in isolation. Meanwhile, neighboring
countries closed their borders. Nine weeks after the
first patient became ill, the outbreak stopped. In all,
175 patients contracted smallpox, and 35 died.
What might happen if smallpox were
released today in a U.S. city? First, routine
vaccination stopped in the United States in 1972.
Some travelers, many military recruits, and a
handful of laboratory workers were vaccinated
over the following 8 years. Overall, however, it is
doubtful that more than 10% to 15% of the
population today has residual smallpox immunity.
If some modest volume of virus were to be
released (perhaps by exploding a light bulb
containing virus in a Washington subway), the
event would almost certainly go unnoticed until
the first cases with rash began to appear 9 or 10
days later. With patients seen by different
physicians (who almost certainly had never
before seen a smallpox case) in different clinics,
several days would probably elapse before the
diagnosis of smallpox was confirmed and an
alarm was sounded.
Even if only 100 persons were infected and
required hospitalization, a group of patients
many times larger would become ill with fever491 Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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and rash and receive an uncertain diagnosis.
Some would be reported from other cities and
other states. Where would all of these patients be
admitted? In the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area, no more than 100 hospital beds provide
adequate isolation. Who would care for the
patients? Few hospital staff have any smallpox
immunity. Moreover, one or two patients with
severe hemorrhagic cases (which typically have
very short incubation periods), who would have
been hospitalized before smallpox was suspected,
would have been cared for by a large, unprotected
intensive care team.
What of contacts? In past outbreaks, contacts
of confirmed or suspected cases numbered in the
thousands, if not tens of thousands. What
measures should or could be taken to deal with
such numbers? Would patients be isolated as in
Yugoslavia, and if so, where? Logistics could be
simplified if rapid, easily used laboratory tests
could confirm or rule out smallpox among suspected
cases. At present, however, such tests are known
only to scientists in two government laboratories.
An immediate clamor for mass vaccination
(as in the outbreaks in Germany and Yugoslavia)
can be predicted. U.S. stocks of smallpox vaccine
are nominally listed at 15 million doses, but with
packaging, the useful number of doses is perhaps
half that number. How widely and quickly should
this vaccine be used? Were vaccine to be limited
strictly to close contacts of confirmed cases,
comparatively few doses would be needed.
However, the realities of dealing with even a small
epidemic would almost certainly preclude such a
cautious, measured vaccination effort. Vaccine
reserves would rapidly disappear, and there is, at
present, no manufacturing capacity to produce
additional vaccine. If an emergency effort were
made to produce new stocks of smallpox vaccine,
many months to a year or more would be required.
What of anthrax, which has been so
enthusiastically embraced by both Iraq and the
Aum Shinrikyo? The organism is easy to produce
in large quantity. In its dried form, it is extremely
stable. The effect of aerosolized anthrax on
humans once had to be inferred from animal
experiments and the occasional human infection
among workers in factories processing sheep and
goat hides (12). It was clear that inhalation of
anthrax is highly lethal. Just how lethal became
evident in the 1979 Sverdlovsk epidemic (13).
In all, 77 cases were identified with certainty;
66 patients died. The actual total number of cases
was probably considerably more than 100. The
persons affected lived or worked somewhere
within a narrow zone extending some 4 km south
and east of a military bioweapons facility. An
accidental airborne release of anthrax spores
occurred during a single day and may well have
lasted no more than minutes. Further investiga-
tions revealed anthrax deaths among sheep and
cows in six different villages up to 50 km
southeast of the military compound along the
same axis as the human cases.
Of the 58 patients with known dates of disease
onset, only 9 had symptoms within a week after
exposure; some became ill as late as 6 weeks after
exposure. Whether the onset of illness occurred
sooner or later, death almost always followed
within 1 to 4 days after onset. However, there
appeared to be a somewhat higher proportion of
survivors after the fourth week. This almost
certainly resulted from the widespread application
of penicillin prophylaxis and anthrax vaccine, both
of which were distributed in mid-April throughout a
population of 59,000.
Meselson and his colleagues, who docu-
mented this outbreak, calculate that the weight
of spores released as an aerosol could have been
as little as a few milligrams or as much as “nearly
a gram.” Iraq acknowledged producing at least
8,000 L of solution with an anthrax spore and cell
count of 109/ml (1). The ramifications of even a
modest-sized release of anthrax spores in a city
are profound. Emergency rooms would begin
seeing a few patients with high fever and some
difficulty breathing perhaps 3 to 4 days after
exposure. By the time the patients were seen, it is
almost certain that it would be too late for
antibiotic therapy. All patients would die within
24 to 48 hours. No emergency room physicians or
infectious disease specialists have ever seen a
case of inhalation anthrax; medical laboratories
have had virtually no experience in its diagnosis.
Thus, at least 3 to 5 days would elapse before a
definitive diagnosis would be made.
Once anthrax was diagnosed, one would be
faced with the prospect of what to do over the
succeeding 6 to 8 weeks. Should vaccine be
administered to those who might have been
exposed? At present, little vaccine is available,
and no plan exists to produce any for civilian use.
Should antibiotics be administered prophylacti-
cally? If so, which antibiotics, and what should be
the criteria for exposure? What quantity would be
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perhaps 500,000 over a 6-week period? Should
one be concerned about additional infections resulting
from anthrax spores subsequently resuspended and
inhaled by others? Should everyone who has been
anywhere near the city report to a local physician
for treatment at the first occurrence of fever or
cough, however mild? Undoubtedly, many would
have such symptoms, especially in the winter;
how can such symptoms be distinguished from
the premonitory symptoms of anthrax that may
proceed to death within 24 to 48 hours?
We are ill-prepared to deal with a terrorist
attack that employs biological weapons. In
countering civilian terrorism, the focus (a modest
extension of existing protocols to deal with a hazard
materials incident) has been almost wholly on
chemical and explosive weapons. A chemical
release or a major explosion is far more manageable
than the biological challenges posed by smallpox or
anthrax. After an explosion or a chemical attack,
the worst effects are quickly over, the dimensions of
the catastrophe can be defined, the toll of injuries
and deaths can be ascertained, and efforts can be
directed to stabilization and recovery. Not so
following the use of smallpox or anthrax. Day
after relentless day, additional cases could be
expected, and in new areas.
The specter of biological weapons use is an
ugly one, every bit as grim and foreboding as that
of a nuclear winter. As was done in response to
the nuclear threat, the medical community
should educate the public and policy makers
about the threat. We need to build on the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to
strengthen measures prohibiting the develop-
ment and production of biological weapons and to
ensure compliance with existing agreements. In a
broader sense, we need a strong moral consensus
condemning biological weapons.
But this is not enough. In the longer term, we
need to be as prepared to detect, diagnose,
characterize epidemiologically, and respond
appropriately to biological weapons use as to the
threat of new and reemerging infections. In fact,
the needs are convergent. We need at interna-
tional, state, and local levels a greater capacity
for surveillance; a far better network of
laboratories and better diagnostic instruments;
and a more adequate cadre of trained epidemiolo-
gists, clinicians, and researchers.
On the immediate horizon, we cannot delay
the development and implementation of strategic
plans for coping with civilian bioterrorism. The
needed stocking of vaccines and drugs as well as
the training and mobilization of health
workers, both public and private, at state, city,
and local levels will require time. Knowing well
what little has been done, I can only say that a
mammoth task lies before us.
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